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Abstract
This paper proves the Hatta (1977) coefficient is the shadow value of government revenue - it is a
scaling coefficient that converts efficiency effects from marginal policy changes into dollar changes
in utility.  The decomposition is generalised to economies with heterogenous consumers and variable
producer prices to show (a) the Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) effect, where extra income reduces
consumer utility, makes the shadow value of government revenue negative; and (b) when Bruce and
Harris (1982) and Diewert (1983) isolate Pareto improvements they choose patterns of revenue
transfers to make the shadow value of government revenue positive for every consumer.  We use the
decomposition to extend the welfare test in Bruce-Harris by allowing revenue transfers with
distorting taxes, and generalise the welfare decomposition of tax inefficiency in Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) by allowing variable producer prices.
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  The final change in social welfare is , and the aggregate shadow value of1
government revenue  with h.  Since policy k does not discriminate between consumers it
cannot be a lump-sum redistribution of income.  We consider income redistribution in section 4 of
the paper.
  When making this analogy it must be assumed domestic consumers do not benefit from2
aid payments to foreign consumers.
1
1.  Introduction
Policy analysts must decide how to aggregate welfare changes over consumers in a cost
benefit analysis.  Dreze and Stern (1985) argue they should assign distributional weights to
the dollar changes in utility for each consumer and then sum them to report a final welfare
change.  And, as a way to indicate how important the subjectively chosen weights are to the
overall analysis, the efficiency and equity effects can be reported separately.  Another
popular approach relies on the compensation principle to convert aggregate welfare gains
into Pareto improvements.  Harberger (1971), for example, sums unweighted dollar changes
in consumer utilities and assumes implicitly they can be converted into Pareto
improvements through lump-sum redistributions of income.  Bruce and Harris (1982) and
Diewert (1983) actually invoke the compensation principle and test for Pareto
improvements.  That is, they make revenue transfers between consumers to see whether the
efficiency gains for a policy change can be converted into dollar gains in utility for every
consumer. 
This paper isolates the welfare effects of transfer policy choices in cost benefit analysis by
generalising a decomposition in Hatta (1977).  For any marginal policy change (k) we
decompose the dollar change in utility for each consumer (h), as:
,
where  is the personal shadow value of government revenue, and  the aggregate
efficiency effect.  This decomposition is obtained from an individualistic social welfare
function, where the change in social welfare, is:
,
with  being the distributional weight for each consumer.   All the income effects are1
isolated in the shadow values of government revenue which are scaling coefficients on the
aggregate efficiency effect.  In essence, efficiency gains ( ) are surplus revenue the
government can collect by implementing policy k and, at the same time, making lump-sum
transfers to hold the utility of every consumer constant; it is foreign aid the economy could
pay at no cost to domestic utility.   When this surplus revenue is transferred to domestic2
consumers, each dollar raises their utility by their personal shadow value of government
revenue.  Thus, socially profitable projects endow surplus revenue on the economy ( ),
and  converts it into utility ( ).  For Pareto improvements (with ), the revenue
transfers must be chosen to make  positive for every consumer.
A number of useful properties follow from this decomposition.  First, the welfare effects of
transfer policies are conveniently isolated in the shadow values of government revenue,
which allows us to test for potential Pareto improvements by choosing transfers to make
.  Also, the decomposition finds income effects are irrelevant in cost-benefit
analysis if the government uses the same pattern of revenue transfers to balance its budget,
W hk ' 0 œh $Wk ' 0
W hR < 0 W hR > 0
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W hR > 0 œh
  Ballard and Fullerton (1992) page 124.3
  There are also well known intransitivities and reversals using the compensation principle4
when utility possibility frontiers cross, which is likely for comparisons between second-best policies. 
Bruce and Harris (1982) show these problems do not arise for marginal policy changes, which are
what we examine in this paper.
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where at a social optimum we must have:  whenever .  Indeed, Ballard and
Fullerton (1992) examine the revised Samuelson condition in a single consumer economy
and conjecture: “To be relevant to cost-benefit analysis, the Pigou-Harberger-Browning
approach must assume that the public good itself essentially compensates the consumer so
that income effects wash out and only substitution effects remain.”   By the Hatta3
decomposition income effects do wash out when policies are optimally chosen in this
setting.
When Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) find a consumer is made worse off by extra real
income the shadow value of government revenue is negative.  It can occur if there are
multiple equilibrium outcomes, which are possible in economies with tax-distorted markets. 
And this makes the compensation principle unreliable because there are efficiency gains
when income is transferred from consumers with  to consumers with .   Thus,4
the welfare test in Bruce and Harris that finds efficiency gains are a necessary and sufficient
condition for Pareto improvements requires .  And it does this by ruling out Foster-
Sonnenschein effects and choosing lump-sum revenue transfers to raise the real income of
every consumer.  But, as Diewert demonstrates, this may not be possible when governments
use distorting taxes.  In policy evaluation it is necessary to determine if there are sufficient
tax instruments to make  when testing for Pareto improvements.  Otherwise
subjective judgements will have to me made about the distributional weights to assign to
consumers when there are winners and losers.  In this paper we derive computable
expressions of the shadow value of government revenue that can be estimated to test for
Foster-Sonnenschein effects, and to determine whether or not Pareto improvements are
possible using the available tax instruments. 
In a conventional Harberger analysis where governments make lump-sum transfers to
balance their budgets, the welfare effects of these transfers are rarely examined.  For
example, when a marginal policy change drives the government budget into surplus there
are an infinite number of ways the revenue can be transferred to consumers, and the
equilibrium outcome will depend on the transfer policy chosen when they have different
marginal propensities to consume income.  Giving them an equal share of the surplus
revenue will not guarantee they have higher real income when prices vary endogenously.  If,
for example, the revenue transfers drive up prices for goods that are net consumed by
individuals they are made worse, and this offsets benefits they get from receiving a share in
the surplus revenue.  To raise the real income of every consumer, personalised revenue
transfers are required in the presence of these distributional effects.  And when the
government does so it makes the shadow value of government revenue positive for every
consumer, in which case, aggregate dollar gains in utility will also be Pareto improvements. 
Furthermore, if Foster-Sonnenschein effects can be ruled out, these dollar gains in utility
will signal efficiency gains.  Thus, in cost benefit analysis we need to know what transfer
policy the government will choose, or to recommend one if Pareto improvements are being
sought, in order to solve actual equilibrium outcomes.
The formal analysis commences in the next section of the paper by demonstrating the Hatta
decomposition of the welfare effects from a marginal tax change for a single consumer.  In
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  This is obtained using the first order conditions for an interior solution to the consumer5
problem, where  and .
  It is the measure obtained by Harberger (1964), and can also be found in Diamond and6
Mirrlees (1971) and Hatta (1977) who compute it in a single consumer economy with a linear
production frontier.  They generalise the welfare change by including additional taxed goods.
  When money income changes endogenously with market prices we are using Bailey7
(1954) demand schedules.
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section 3 we prove the Hatta coefficient, which isolates income effects from marginal tax
changes, is the shadow value of government revenue, and we generalise the decomposition
to any marginal policy change in economies with heterogeneous consumers and non-linear
production frontiers.  When governments distribute surplus revenue using distorting taxes
the welfare effects from the transfers are isolated in the “revised” shadow value of
government revenue.  We derive it in an economy with heterogenous consumers in section 4
and use it to extend the welfare tests for Pareto improvements in Bruce and Harris.  The
paper concludes in section 5 with a brief summary of the main findings.
2.  The Hatta Decomposition - An Intuitive Explanation
Much of the intuition for the Hatta decomposition can be obtained by marginally raising a
commodity tax (t) for a single price-taking consumer who purchases two goods to maximise
utility, .  The budget constraint is: , with M being a
fixed endowment of money income, L a lump-sum transfer from the government, q  the0
consumer price of good 0, and q  = p +t the consumer price of good 1.  The welfare loss1 1
from marginally raising the tax, is:
(1) ,5
where λ the marginal utility of income.  In a conventional Harberger analysis tax revenue is
returned to the consumer as a lump-sum transfer (L = tx ) to balance the government budget. 1
A conventional measure of the change in tax inefficiency is obtained by using the
consumer's budget constraint to write the welfare change in (1), as:
(2) .6
It is the welfare loss from driving down demand for good 1 in the presence of the tax
distortion.  Since demand is a function of consumer prices and money income, this loss can
be decomposed as:
(3) .7
With constant producer prices we have  and .  There are two ways of
solving the income effect in (3), and we consider each in turn.
(a)  A Slutsky decomposition holds money income constant.  By substituting  into
(3) and applying the Slutsky decomposition, the welfare loss in (2), becomes:
Wk 'WR $Wk
Wt ' $Wt & x12
$Wt ' t M $x1 (q ) /Mq1 2 ' t Mx1 (q , I ) /MI
Wt < 0
MI /Mt ' t (Mx1 /Mt) % x1
Wt '
$Wt
1 & 2
Wt ' $Wt AIM $Wt
WR
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  This is the approach adopted by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) who rule out lump-sum8
transfers.
  This allows us to write the Hatta decomposition as: .9
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Figure 1:Tax Inefficiency with Perfect Complements
(4) ,8
with  being the compensated welfare loss, and  the income
effect.  The additively separable income and substitution effects in (4) reinforce each other
when good 1 is normal (with ).
(b) A Hatta decomposition allows money income to change by returning tax revenue to the
consumer in a conventional manner as a lump-sum transfer.  It is obtained by computing the
change in money income in (3) using the budget constraint, as: , and
applying the Slutsky decomposition, where the welfare loss in (2), becomes:
(5) .
Hatta isolates the income effect in the coefficient AIM = 1-θ, and writes the welfare loss in
(5), as: , where the dollar change in utility originates from the substitution
effect.  There is good economic intuition for this result.  The compensated welfare loss ( )
is the amount of foreign aid the government would need to receive to balance its budget
after making lump-sum transfers to hold utility constant.  When this loss is financed from
within the economy by imposing a lump-sum tax on the consumer, each dollar reduces
utility by one over the Hatta coefficient AIM.  In the next section we show that 1/AIM is the
shadow value of government revenue ( ), which is the amount utility rises when a dollar
of revenue is endowed on the economy (as foreign aid).   Thus, the smaller the substitution9
effect from the tax change, the smaller the dollar fall in utility.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 where the
two goods are perfect complements to
eliminate the substitution effect.  After
the tax rises, and before the revenue is
returned, the consumer moves from A to
B.  When the revenue is returned as a
lump-sum transfer the consumer moves
back along the income expansion path
(IEP) to the initial bundle A.  Since no
substitution has occurred there is no
welfare loss.  With substitution the new
consumption bundle would lie to the left
of A along the old budget line ( ) on an
indifference curve below u .0
This is illustrated in Figure 2 for
homothetic preferences where the tax moves the consumption bundle from A to B before the
x0
q 0& p 0
q 0& p 0
q 1& p 0
q 0& p 0
AIM < 0
  The deadweight loss in DE is the foreign aid needed to fund the compensating variation10
net of the tax revenue raised at E.
  There is no suggestion by this demonstration of the tax change that anything is wrong11
with the Slutsky decomposition.  On the contrary, it is used in the Hatta decomposition.  What the
analysis does is extend the Slutsky decomposition by allowing consumer income to change
endogenously with the transfers of surplus that accompany price changes.  Thus, it is a
decomposition that arises naturally in a general equilibrium analysis where surplus transfers from
policy changes are included through the private and public sector budget constraints.  We take this up
in the next section of the paper.
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Figure 2: Tax Inefficiency with Substitution
Figure 3: Multiple Equilibria with Linear Production
tax revenue is returned.  When it is
returned as a lump-sum transfer,
consumption moves along the new
income expansion path IEP(q ) to point1
C, which lies on the original budget
constraint on a lower indifference curve
(not illustrated).  Due to the substitution
effect, outside compensation is required
to move the consumer back onto u ; it is0
DE (in units of good ).   This tax10
inefficiency increases with the
substitution effect from the tax
change.   When the loss DE falls on the11
consumer, the income effects move the
consumption bundle to point C where
utility falls.  This change in utility is
determined by the Hatta coefficient, which is positive when both goods are normal.  
Foster and Sonnenschein effects make the Hatta coefficient negative, and they occur when
there a multiple equilibria, which
requires one of the two goods to be
inferior.  An example is illustrated in
Figure 3 where the income expansion
path for the initial tax distortion 
cuts the consumption frontier more than
once due to good 0 being inferior; and
with non-satiation it must cut an odd
number of times.  The equilibria at A
and C are for the same tax , while
B is associated with a higher tax . 
As consumption moves along the
frontier from A to C utility rises.  Thus,
if we start at B and reduce the tax to
 the new equilibrium could be at
A where utility is lower.  If this
happens, the increase in real income
drives down utility, and we have .
Hatta, and Foster and Sonnenschein look at equilibrium adjustment mechanisms to rule this
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  Hatta uses a Marshallian adjustment process to show the points A and B in Figure 3 are12
stable equilibria because both goods are normal.  It is a process, where:
(i)  consumer prices are determined by a bidding process to clear any excess demand for
output which cannot change instantaneously; and,
(ii)  producers adjust output in the next period if there are differences between the relative
producer prices and relative marginal production costs.
  The welfare measures can be extended to include internationally traded goods, but they13
are omitted here to simplify the analysis.
  By totally differentiating the private budget constraint, we have:14
.
Using the first order conditions for consumers the change in utility becomes: , and
for competitive profit maximising firms .  After substitution, we obtain (6) by using the
market clearing conditions:  for all i 0 N.
  Recall that  with specific tax wedges.15
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out.   Clearly, homothetic preferences will rule it out because there is a unique equilibrium12
associated with each tax when the goods are normal.  But, as Foster and Sonnenschein
show, this will not rule out multiple equilibria when the production frontier is non linear and
there are more than two goods.
In summary, income effects for incremental policy changes are a scaling coefficient when
the surplus transfers that accompany price changes are taken into account.  It arises naturally
in general equilibrium where surplus transfers are automatically included through the private
and public sector budget constraints.  This is now demonstrated in a single consumer
economy.
3.  Welfare Measures in a Single Consumer Economy
Consider a single consumer who chooses a vector of (N+1) non-traded goods x to maximise
utility u(x) with expenditure ( ) constrained by income: ; it is the
market value of the endowment vector ( ) plus profits from private production ( ) and
lump-sum transfers from the government (L).   The private net output vector  has  for13
outputs and   for inputs.  Good 0 is chosen as numeraire, and the only distortions are
the vector of specific taxes t on final production that drive wedges between the consumer
( ) and producer ( ) prices, with .  Since the taxes are fixed in dollar terms we have
 when prices change endogenously, and the price changes clear the goods markets,
which are competitive, with:  for all i 0 N.  Finally, the public sector budget
constraint is:  where  is production tax revenue,  profit from
public production, and  foreign aid payments.
In this economy dollar changes in utility for marginal changes in the three exogenous policy
variables (z, t and R) are solved using:
(6) ,14
where the first two terms are standard changes in private surplus to the left of demand and
supply schedules.  Higher producer prices and taxes lower private surplus, while additional
lump-sum transfers raise it by .   By using the market clearing conditions, we can write
the first term in (6), as: ;  it is the fall in consumer surplus 
plus the increase in producer surplus .    When the government balances its budget, the15
T ' t (y % z ) ' t (x & 6x )
dL ' dT % zdp % pdz & dR
dT ' tdx % (x & 6x )dt
du
8 ' pdz % tdx & dR
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  Using the market clearing conditions we can write tax revenue, as:16
.
It will be assumed the domestic consumer does not benefit from foreign aid payments.  They are
hypothetical payments used to isolate potential gains, which in most cases, are returned to the
domestic economy.
  Compensated welfare changes are isolated by the foreign aid transfers that would hold17
utility constant at its initial level.  This makes R endogenous and u exogenous for these welfare
measures.
  Harberger also includes changes in foreign prices to account for terms of trade effects18
when there are internationally traded goods.
  This is the counterpart of Harberger's (1971) equation 6 on page 789.19
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lump-sum transfers are:
(7) ,
with: .  A conventional welfare equation is obtained by substituting these
transfers in (7) into (6), as:
(8) .16
Since the policy variables are exogenous the welfare changes can be solved as functions of
z, t and R, and to simplify the notation we use unmarked derivatives to denote actual
changes in activity (e.g., ), and capped derivatives to denote
compensated changes in activity (e.g., ).17
Harberger identifies two types of problems in applied welfare economics - there are 
“substitution effect only” problems that redistribute given resources within the economy,
and combined “income and substitution effect” problems that result from exogenous
changes in real income.   Tax changes are “substitution effect only” problems, as are price18
controls, production quota, and public sector projects when governments use the same
production technologies as private firms, while foreign aid payments and exogenous
changes in production technologies are examples of “income and substitution effect”
problems.  Harberger's fundamental welfare equation applies to “substitution effect only”
problems and is obtained from (8) by setting . Thus, for a marginal increase in the
tax on good k, we have:
(9) .19
It is the dollar change in utility from moving resources between tax-distorted markets, and
can be extended in a fairly straightforward manner to include non-tax distortions, such as
externalities and non-competitive behaviour.
The social profit for a project that produces one unit of good k using input j is obtained from
(8), as:
(10) ,
with  being the input-output coefficient for the public sector, and  the input-
pk % pjayj , k ' 0
du /8 ' 0 d $R ' pd $z % td $x
d $R /dtk d $R /dzk
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  We use the fact that profit maximizing firms produce until at the margin:20
 .
  In the compensated equilibrium the conventional welfare equation is obtained from (8) by21
setting , with .  Thus, the compensated welfare effects for the policy changes
measure the changes in foreign aid payments (  and ) to hold utility constant.
  Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) also prove the relative producer prices of goods are equal22
to their relative shadow prices when producer prices vary endogenously if taxes are Ramsey optimal. 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) obtain the same result in economies with variable producer prices when
there is a 100 percent profits tax and Ramsey optimal commodity taxes.
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output coefficient for private firms.   It is a “substitution effect only” problem when the20
public sector uses the same production technology as private firms (with ).  If the
public sector is less efficient due to soft budget constraints or principal agent problems (with
), the first term in (10) represents an exogenous fall in real income; it makes
the project a combined “income and substitution effect” problem.  In fact, many policy
choices are accompanied by exogenous reductions in real income.  Rent controls are a good
example because they usually involve rationing and rent seeking costs that can reduce
private surplus by even more than the standard allocative inefficiency under the scheme.
Our next task is to isolate the income effects for the welfare changes in (9) and (10).
3.1  Welfare Decompositions with Constant Producer Prices
Hatta (1977) decomposes the welfare effects for marginal tax changes in a C-economy
where goods are supplied at constant aggregate marginal cost.  We replicate the analysis
here for the tax change and the small public project.
Proposition 1:  With constant producer prices, the welfare effects in (9) and (10) can be
decomposed, as:
,
with: ,     and  .21
Proof:  See section 1 of the Appendix.
All the income effects are isolated in the Hatta coefficient (1-θ), and we examine its sign in
section 3.3.  The compensated welfare effects may be positive or negative.  With Ramsey
optimal commodity taxes there is a compensated welfare loss from the tax change (with
< 0), but with non-optimal taxes, second best effects may result in a welfare gain if taxed
activities expand sufficiently to make > 0.  When the government produces less
efficiently than private firms (with ) there is a compensated welfare loss
from the project, but if the public sector is equally efficient (with ), then by
proposition 1, there can be no dollar change in utility from the project (since = 0).  This
confirms a result in Diamond and Mirrlees (1976) where shadow prices for goods are equal
to their producer prices in C-economies when the public and private firms use the same
technologies.   There is no welfare gain from extra public output because it crowds out the22
same private output.  However, the result no longer applies when the public sector has
higher production costs.
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  The price changes are solved using the goods market clearing conditions for the N goods23
whose relative price changes,.
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3.2  Welfare Decompositions with Variable Producer Prices
Even though the welfare decompositions become more cumbersome when producer prices
change endogenously in economies with non-linear production frontiers, the income effects
continue to be a scaling coefficient on the compensated welfare effects.  This is confirmed
by:
Proposition 2:  With variable producer prices, the welfare effects in (9) and (10) can be
decomposed, as:
,
with: ;  ; and . 
We define:  and , where  is an element of the
matrix .23
Proof:  See section 2 of the Appendix.
These decompositions have exactly the same interpretation as those obtained with constant
producer prices in Proposition 1.  Differences arise through changes in taxed activities
which determine the resource movements across distorted activities.  In particular, prices
now change endogenously with the income effects.
Before establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for welfare improvements in single
consumer economies we examine the sign of the Hatta coefficient (1-θ).  If it is positive,
incremental policy changes will raise utility whenever there are efficiency gains.
3.3 The Shadow Value of Government Revenue
It is clear from Propositions 1 and 2 that the Hatta coefficient (1-θ) converts compensated
welfare effects into utility, and this leads to:
Proposition 3: The inverse of the Hatta coefficient is the shadow value of government
revenue, with:
,
where:  - for constant producer prices; and, 
 - for variable producer prices.
Proof:  If a dollar of revenue is endowed on the economy as foreign aid, the welfare change
is obtained using (8), as:
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  This decomposition is derived in section 3 of the Appendix.24
  With two goods (  and ) we have:25
,
with: .  When both goods are normal the relative price of good
1 increases with income, with , so that .
10
(11) ,
where the decomposition in Proposition 3 is obtained by solving the endogenous changes in
prices and income to write the change in tax revenue, as: . 224
When Foster and Sonnenschein find additional income lowers utility in a single consumer
economy the shadow value of government revenue is negative.  From (11) we can see that
this occurs when income effects reduce tax revenue by more than the initial dollar of
revenue endowed on the economy (with ).  In C-economies where income effects
do not affect producer prices, we can use the budget constraint to write the Hatta coefficient
as:
,
which can only be negative with inferior goods.  Thus, local Foster-Sonnenschein effects
(LFSE) can be ruled out here by adopting a homogenous utility function.  And with all
goods normal the shadow value of government revenue will be larger than unity because
income effects generate additional tax revenue (with ).  But this will not rule out
LFSE in economies with non-linear production frontiers.  Once producer prices vary
endogenously the Hatta coefficient becomes: 
,
where the first term is positive when goods are normal, but that will not stop the second
term being larger and negative if there are more then two goods.   Its sign depends on the25
price changes which are determined by the shape of the production frontier.  Thus, to rule
out LFSE we will need to rely on equilibrium adjustment mechanisms that choose outcomes
where utility is highest.  Foster and Sonnenschein consider one such mechanism - it
involves making Slutsky compensation to overcompensate consumers for a policy change
and to then withdraw income until full equilibrium is achieved at the highest possible utility. 
For the example illustrated in Figure 3, a reduction in the tax at B would move the economy
to equilibrium C where utility is higher than it would be at A.  In practice we can test for
LFSE empirically by computing the shadow value of government revenue using estimates of
the own and cross price elasticities for the demands and supplies of goods to solve the price
changes.  At this point we follow Bruce and Harris and rule out LFSE to establish the
following welfare test.
Theorem 1:  In the absence of LFSE, the necessary and sufficient condition for a welfare
gain from any small policy change k in a single consumer economy where the government
balances its budget using lump-sum transfers is .
WR
WR
d $R
dv ' MvMk dk %
Mv
MR d
$R ' 0 for k 0 t
k
,z
k
Wk 'WR $Wk for k 0 tk ,zk
WR > 0
Wk > 0 $Wk > 0
(Wk )D ' Wk % mebd
ML
Mk for k ' tk , zk , and d 0 t
mebd ' & (WR )D (ML /Mtd ) ML /Mtd
ML /Mk
  The shadow value of government revenue  is not the marginal social cost of public26
funds (MCF).  Instead, it measures the welfare gain from an extra dollar of revenue as foreign aid,
while the MCF measures the welfare gain from transferring a dollar of revenue between the
government and the private sector of the economy.  Thus, based on the way Harberger distinguishes
between problems,  is the welfare change for a “income and substitution effect” problem, while
MCF is the welfare change for a “substitution effect only” problem.
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Proof:  Since consumer demands are functions of the exogenous policy variables z, t and R,
we can write indirect utility as v(z,t,R).  This function is a unique mapping in the absence of
multiple equilibria (which is the case with no LFSE).  For incremental policy change k, the
outside compensation ( ) to hold utility constant, solves:
.
After multiplying this expression by one over the marginal utility of income (λ), we have:
(12) ,
where in the absence of LFSE,  in the single consumer economy.  Thus, utility rises
( ) whenever there are efficiency gains ( ).226
Theorem 1 holds with constant and variable producer prices, and it follows directly from the
welfare decompositions in Propositions 1, 2 and 3.  We now generalise this theorem to
economies where the government balances its budget using distorting taxes instead of lump-
sum transfers.
3.4  Revised Welfare Changes
A number of studies acknowledge the fact that governments balance their budgets with
distorting taxes.  Diamond and Mirrlees (1971, 1976) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972)
obtain welfare measures when lump-sum taxes are ruled out.  We follow Pigou (1947) by
referring to them as revised welfare measures.  They can be decomposed as conventional
(lump-sum) welfare effects plus changes in tax inefficiency when distorting taxes are used
to balance the government budget, where:
Proposition 4: The revised welfare effects for the incremental policy choices examined in
(9) and (10), are:
,
with  being the marginal excess burden for tax d; it is the welfare
loss per dollar change in government revenue ( ), where the revenue transfers are
solved using (7).
Proof: See section 4 in the Appendix.
In project evaluation, changes in tax inefficiency are determined by how much revenue the
government must transfer to balance its budget.  Thus, the revised and conventional welfare
measures are equal if policy changes do not affect the government budget (with  = 0). 
The revised welfare change from marginally increasing tax k in Proposition 4 provides a
convenient way to identify the Ramsey rule for optimal commodity taxes, where:
(WR )D
( $Wtk )D ' $Wtk % mebD (M $L /Mtk ) ( $Wzk )D ' $Wzk % $mebD (M $L /Mzk )
du /8 ' 0
(Wtk )D ' mebd & mebk
dL
dtk
(Wtk )D ' 0
mebd ' (WR )D $mebd (WR )D
(Wtk )D ' (WR )D $mebd & $mebk
dL
dtk
' 0
$mebd ''i ti (M $xi /Mtd ) / (M $L /Mtd )
(WR )D
(Wk )D ' (WR )D ( $Wk )D for k ' tk , zk
(WR )D ' WR mcfd % mebd'i zi"i I
mcfd ' 1 % mebd
vD (z , t&d ,R ) t&d
d $R
dv
D
'
Mv
D
Mk dk %
Mv
D
MR d
$R ' 0 for k ' t
k
, z
k
  This decomposition is derived in section 5 of the Appendix.   measures the change27
in utility when a dollar of foreign aid is endowed on the government who transfers it to the private
sector by lowering tax d.
  The compensated welfare changes, are:28
  and ,
where the compensating transfers are solved using (6) with .
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(13) .
Since the extra revenue collected by increasing tax k is returned to the consumer by
lowering tax d it represents a marginal change in the tax mix to raise a given amount of
revenue.  Thus, when taxes are Ramsey optimal with , they have the same marginal
excess burden.  Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) prove the income effects play no role in
choosing these optimal taxes in single consumer economies with constant producer prices. 
We extend this to economies with variable producer prices by decomposing the marginal
excess burden for tax d as: , where  is the revised shadow value of
government revenue.  After substitution the welfare change in (13) for Ramsey optimal
taxes, becomes:
,27
with  being the compensated tax inefficiency per dollar of
compensating transfer using tax d.  Since the income effects are isolated in  they will
not play a role in setting the optimal taxes.
Proposition 5:  With variable producer prices, the revised welfare effects for the policy
changes in Proposition 4 can be decomposed, as:
,
where the revised shadow value of government revenue, is:
(14) ,
with  being the marginal social cost of public funds; it is the change in private
surplus when a dollar of revenue is transferred from the private economy to balance the
government budget using tax d.28
Proof:  When the government balances its budget using tax d, we can write indirect utility
as: , where  is the vector of taxes excluding tax d which changes endogenously. 
For marginal policy changes, the outside compensation ( ) to hold utility constant, solves:
,
where the decomposition in Proposition 5 is obtained by multiplying this expression by one
over the marginal utility of income (λ) and rearranging terms.2
Now when a dollar of revenue is endowed on the economy as foreign aid, the government
balances its budget by lowering tax d.  Utility will rise in the absence of LFSE (with
qx h ' q h 6x h % Dhpy % g hL
Dh 'hDh ' 1 g h'h g h ' 1
(WR )D > 0 mebd > 0
( $Wk )D > 0
(WR )D > 0 (Wk )D > 0 ( $Wk )D > 0
W ' W v 1 (z , t ,R ,g ) , .................... ,v H (z , t ,R ,g )
v h (z , t ,R ,g )
  Each consumer maximises u (x) subject to the budget constraint: 29 h
where  is h's share of the profits from private production with , and  is h's share of
lump-sum transfers the government makes to balance its budget with .
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) if there are efficiency gains from lowering the tax (with ).  Foster and
Sonnenschein find this to be the case for radial tax reductions, and it also applies when taxes
are Ramsey optimal.  While these are sufficient conditions for the revised shadow of value
of government revenue in (14) to be positive, they are not necessary.  Thus, we have:
Theorem 2: In the absence of LFSE, the necessary and sufficient condition for a welfare
gain from any small policy change k in a single consumer economy where the government
balances its budget using distorting taxes to make the revised shadow value of government
revenue positive is .
Proof:  From Proposition 5, if  then  whenever .2
Thus, if there are efficiency gains from a policy change it will generate surplus revenue that
allows the government to lower distorting taxes.  The resulting fall in tax inefficiency will
raise the revised welfare change above the conventional (lump-sum) welfare change.
4.  Welfare Measures with Multiple Consumers
In economies with heterogenous consumers there are distributional effects to account for in
project evaluation.  Indeed, for most policy changes some consumers gain and others lose. 
Three factors determine the welfare changes - the sign and size of the compensated welfare
effects, the distributional weights assigned to consumers, and the pattern of revenue
transfers the government uses to balance its budget.  Harberger assigns the same
distributional weights to consumers and identifies a welfare gain when the sum of the dollar
changes in utility is positive.  This approach relies on two implicit assumptions - first, the
government can make personalised lump-sum revenue transfers to convert compensated
gains into Pareto improvements i.e., to raise the utility of every consumer, and second, the
shadow value of government revenue is positive.  In practice, governments use distorting
taxes to make revenue transfers, and unless they have sufficient tax instruments, or can
personalise tax changes, it may not be possible to convert compensated gains into Pareto
improvements.
Diewert (1983) recognises this by including transfer policy choices in welfare tests to
determine whether there are Pareto improvements for small policy changes.  The tests pass
if governments can personalise the transfers using the available set of taxes to raise the
utility of every consumer, and they do not rely on the choice of distributional weights. 
Rather, they rely on social welfare rising with Pareto improvements.  Bruce and Harris
(1982) refine the tests with lump-sum transfers by ruling out LFSE.  And by doing so they
make the shadow value of government revenue positive for every consumer so that Pareto
improvements occur whenever there are efficiency gains.  We now extend this to allow
revenue transfers with distorting taxes, and demonstrate the role played by the shadow of
government revenue.  Throughout the remaining analysis producer prices vary
endogenously, and aggregate welfare is measured using the individualistic social welfare
function:
(15) ,29
where:  is indirect utility for each consumer h = 1,......,H, and g the vector of
'h g h ' 1
d $R
dW ' '
h
$hW hk dk & '
h
$hW hRd $R ' 0 for k 0 tk , zk
$h ' MW /Mv h 8h
$Wk ' d $R /dk
W hk 'W
h
R
$Wk for k 0 tk , zk
W hk$W hk
W hR 'WR g
h % 's DE hs % g hzs "sI
DEs
h ' ( 6x hs & x hs % Dhs y )
'h DE hs % g hzs ' 0 œs
g h' 6g œh W hR > 0's DE hs % g hzs "sI < 0
W hR < 0
$Wk
W hR
W hR > 0 œh
WR > 0 $Wk > 0'h$hW hk dk
$Wk > 0
  The Hatta coefficient is defined in Proposition 3 for variable producer prices.30
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shares in the lump-sum transfers made by the government to balance its budget with
.  In a conventional Harberger analysis lump-sum transfers change endogenously,
but the shares in these transfers are a policy variable the government can choose, and this
makes the final welfare change a function of these transfer shares.
Compensated welfare effects for any policy change k are isolated as the foreign aid
payments ( ) that would hold the utility of every consumer constant, where from (15) we
have:
(16) ,
with  being the distributional weight.  Since the personal shadow value of
government converts each consumer's share of the aggregate efficiency gain ( )
into utility, we have:
(17) .
The final welfare changes ( ) are ultimately determined by each consumer's share of the
aggregate efficiency gain ( ) plus any distributional effects when prices change
endogenously with the revenue transfers.  This is confirmed by decomposing the personal
shadow value of government revenue, as:
(18) ,30
where  is the distributional effect for each h from a rise in the price of
good s.  When these distributional effects are combined with h's share of the change in profit
on public production, it isolates the net change in private surplus due to price changes,
which are purely distributional since .  Giving each consumer an equal
share in the surplus revenue (with ) will not guarantee they have .  If the
endogenous price changes reduces a consumer's surplus (with ) it is
possible for .  Thus, the transfer shares will need to be personalised to offset any
adverse distributional effects.
There are two sets of personalised lump-sum transfers in the decomposition in (16); one set
isolates the efficiency gains ( ), while the other set distributes these gains to consumers
( ).  Since there are different substitution effects for different policy changes, the
compensating transfers are a function of k, but the revenue transfers are not because they
distribute surplus revenue to consumers for any policy change.  If the transfers are chosen to
make the personal shadow value of government revenue in (18) positive for every consumer
(with ), there will be Pareto improvements (in the absence of LFSE, which makes
), whenever there are efficiency gains (with ).  Thus, final changes in social
welfare ( ) are accompanied by the sum of these two sets of personalised transfers.  
This leads to:
Theorem 3 (Theorem 5 - Bruce and Harris (1982)):  In the absence of LFSE, the necessary
and sufficient condition for a welfare gain from any small policy change k in a multiple
consumer economy where the government balances its budget using lump-sum transfers is
.
dL ' 0
(dW )
D
' '
h
$h '
s
DE h
s
dp
s
& '
i
(x h
i
& 6x h
i
)dt
i
WR > 0
g h%'s (DE hs % g hzs )"sI > 0 œh
W hk > 0 œh $Wk > 0
dW ' 'hW hgh dg h &'hW hR d $R ' 0'h dg h ' 0
$Wgh ''hd $R /dg h ' 0 6$
(dW )D ' '
h
$h (W hk )Ddk & '
h
$h (W hR )D (d $R )D ' 0 for k 0 tk , zk
(W hk )D ' (W hR )D ( $Wk )D for k 0 tk , zk
( $Wk )D ' (d $R /dk )D
  By summing the dollar changes in utility over consumer using (6) with , we can31
write the change in social welfare, as:
.
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Proof:  By ruling out LFSE we have , and by choosing personalised lump-sum
transfers to make , the shadow value of government revenue in
(18) is positive for all consumers.  Thus, from (17), there are Pareto improvements (with
) whenever .2
This is the welfare test in Bruce and Harris that relies on the compensation principle to
convert compensated gains into Pareto improvements.  The decompositions in (17) and (18)
make it clear how the transfer and other policy changes are combined in this test.  Diewert
obtains sufficient conditions for Pareto improvements which do not require efficiency gains. 
If Foster-Sonnenschein effects make the shadow value of government revenue negative for
every consumer, there can be Pareto improvements from efficiency losses.  For example,
radial tax increases can move consumers from low to high utility outcomes in the presence
of multiple equilibria.  However, once Foster-Sonnenschein effects are ruled out, which is
the basis for the Bruce-Harris test, Pareto improvements require efficiency gains.
Before extending the welfare test in Theorem 3 to transfers with distorting taxes, we
consider the welfare effects of a lump-sum redistribution of income between consumers,
where:
,
with .
In the absence of Foster-Sonnenschein effects there are no efficiency effects, with
.  Thus, when consumers have the same distributional weights ( ) there
can be no change in social welfare.  Any welfare gains must exploit differences in the
distributional weights across consumers in these circumstances.
When governments use distorting taxes they can make the revised shadow value of
government revenue positive for every consumer if there are sufficient tax instruments to
personalise the transfers.  And this extends the Bruce-Harris test to distorting taxes when
Foster-Sonnenschein effects are ruled out.  However, if the transfers cannot be personalised,
or if there are Foster-Sonnenschein effects, the shadow value of government revenue may
not be positive for every consumer.  In this case, efficiency gains cannot be converted into
Pareto improvements.
For small policy changes, the foreign aid payments that would hold utility constant for every
consumer h when the government makes revenue transfers with distorting taxes, is obtained
using (15), as:
(19) .31
Since the personalised transfers convert surplus revenue into utility, we have:
(20)  ,
where:  is the compensated revised welfare change; it is the surplus revenue
the government can raise when it uses distorting taxes to hold the utility of every consumer
mcf hd ' (x hd& 6x hd ) &'sDE hs MpsMtd MLMtd
(W hR )D 'WR 'sDE hs & 'i mcf hi MLMti dtidR D
dL
dR
D
' MLMR % 'i MLMti dtidR D ' 0
(W hR )D 'WR mcf hd % 's DE hs % mcf hd zs "sI
mcf hd
g h
mcf hd
'h (W hR )D 'WR mcfd % mebd'szs"sI
mcf hd > 1
( $Wk )D > 0
WR > 0
mcf hd % 's DE hs % mcf hd zs "sI > 0
(W hk )D > 0 œh ( $Wk )D > 0
  For tax d we have: .32
When multiple taxes are used to balance the budget, the revised shadow value of government
revenue will be:
,
where the tax changes required to balance the government budget, solve:
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constant.  If tax d is used to balance the government budget, the personalised shadow value
of government revenue becomes:
(21) ,
where  is the personal marginal cost of public funds; it replaces the lump-sum transfer
share  in (18) and is the direct increase in the private surplus of consumer h when a dollar
of surplus revenue is transferred from the government budget using tax d.   There are32
additional distributional effects from the tax changes that are included in , and we
confirm the distributional effects will wash out by summing the (unweighted) personal
shadow value of government revenue in (21) over consumers, where:
.  This is the revised shadow value of government revenue
in (14) for the single (aggregated) consumer.  Whenever marginal tax increases raise the
marginal excess burden of taxation, we have .  And, as noted previously, this occurs
for radial tax increases, and for increases in Ramsey optimal taxes.  Diewert makes the
observation that it may be necessary to change a potentially large number of taxes to realise
Pareto improvements for a policy change, whereas in other circumstances it may be
achieved by using a single tax.  Ultimately, the tax changes that make the shadow value of
government revenue positive for every consumer will depend on the distributional effects in
(21), which are determined by the net demands for taxed goods across consumers.  If there
are insufficient commodity taxes to achieve this, the government must be able to personalise
the tax changes on one or a number of commodities.  That is, it must be able to set different
taxes for different consumers.  This leads to:
Theorem 4:  If, in the absence of LSFE, the government can make the shadow value of
government revenue positive for every consumer using distorting taxes, then the necessary
and sufficient condition for a welfare gain from any small policy change k in a multiple
consumer economy is .
Proof:  By ruling out LFSE we have , and by choosing personalised lump-sum
transfers to make , the revised shadow value of government
revenue in (21) is positive for all h.  Thus, from (20), there are Pareto improvements (with
) whenever .2
5.  Concluding Remarks
This paper has isolated income effects for marginal policy changes in the shadow value of
government revenue.  It provides a convenient way to determine the welfare effects of
government transfer policy choices in cost-benefit analysis.  In a conventional analysis there
are lump-sum revenue transfers, and little mention is made about them because they are
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non-distorting.  However, final welfare changes are a function of the way revenue is
transferred across consumers.  And if the pattern of transfers is chosen to make the shadow
value of government revenue positive for every consumer there will be Pareto
improvements whenever aggregate dollar changes in utility are positive.  Also, if Foster-
Sonnenschein effects are ruled out, these utility gains will signal efficiency gains.  We
derived computable expressions of the personal shadow value of government revenue for
lump-sum and distorting taxes that can be used in applied work to estimate the welfare
effects of government transfer policy choices, and to test for Foster-Sonnenschein effects.
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  By combining the private and public sector budget constraints, we have:33
.
The income effect is based on profit maximising production choices in competitive markets, with: 
  and  .
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Appendix
1.   Proof to Proposition 1:  Since demand is a function of consumer prices and money
income, we can write the change in tax revenue in (9), as:
,
and the changes in tax revenue in (10), as:
.
With constant producer prices, we have , , and .  The
changes in income are solved by combining the private and public sector budget constraints,
where:
 and .33
After substitution, we have:
,   ,   and  .
The welfare decompositions in Proposition 1 are obtained by substituting these changes in
tax revenue into the welfare changes in (9) and (10), and using the first order conditions for
profit maximising private firms (with: ).2
2.  Proof of Proposition 2:  We use welfare decompositions in Sieper (1981).  With variable
producer prices the change in tax revenue in (9) can be decomposed, as:
,
and the changes in tax revenue in (10), as:
.
The changes in income are solved using the budget constraints, where:
  and .
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The price changes are determined by the goods market clearing conditions for each good i,
and are solved using the following system of equations which are stacked over N goods:
, 
where:  and ,34
with:  and an element of the matrix .
After substituting the income effects and price changes into the changes in tax revenue, we
have:
 and ,
with: .
The welfare decompositions in Proposition 2 are obtained by substituting these changes in
tax revenue into the welfare changes in (9) and (10).2
3.  With variable producer prices the change in tax revenue in Proposition 3 can be
decomposed, as:
.
The price changes are solved using the market clearing conditions for the N goods whose
prices change, where for each good s, we have:
.
The change in consumer income is solved using the budget constraints, as:
.
After substitution, we have: , with: ,
for variable producer prices.  With fixed producer prices, we have: .
4.  Proof of Proposition 4:  The revised welfare effect for representative policy k solves:
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  This is obtained using the price-tax relationships, where:35
  From (7) we have: , with price changes: .36
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.
It is a combination of two conventional Harberger terms that are isolated by “notional”
lump-sum transfers to balance the government budget.  The first is the conventional welfare
change , and the second the change in tax inefficiency .  When tax h changes to
balance the government budget it offsets the “notional” transfers, with:
.
The welfare change in Proposition 4 is obtained by solving the tax change.2
5.  Using the conventional welfare equation in (8) and the revenue transfer equation in (7), we
can write the marginal excess burden for tax d with variable producer prices, as:
.35
Following the approach in sections 2 and 3 above, this can be decomposed, as:
,
with:  and .
The revised shadow value of government revenue is obtained from (8), as:
.
This is decomposed by solving the revenue transfers using (7), where:
.36
After substitution we have: .
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